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"I want you to overcome 'em with yeses, undermine 
'em with grins, agree 'em to death and destruction, let 
'em swoller you till they vomit or bust wide open." 
They thought the old man had gone out of his mind. 
He had been the meekest of men. 
 … [H]e had spoken of his meekness as a 
dangerous activity.   
—Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man 
 
As a deceptive weapon, [bluffing] is at least as 
important as slowplaying. Whereas slowplaying 
suggests weakness when you have strength, bluffing 
announces strength when you are weak. Recollect the 
Fundamental Theorem of Poker: Any time an 
opponent plays his hand incorrectly based on what 
you have, you have gained; and any time he plays his 
hand correctly based on what you have, you have 
lost. 
—David Sklansky, The Theory of Poker 
 
 In her bet with him, the Sphinx takes sly 
notice of the soles, thick and scarred, of her 
sandal-footed contestant. 
 As he confronts her with cool bluster 
there outside the gates of Thebes, to which 
he seeks entry, she already discerns 
something of importance in this peculiar 
quirk of his before he ever even announces 
his name – Oedipus – that means “swollen 
foot.” Aware of these things, certainly she 
also knows that there are other riddles 
among her knotted repertoire of puzzles that 
she might choose from in order to test this 
brash upstart. You know, riddles other than 
the particular one she likes to stump 
trespassers with that has everything to do 
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with feet.1 (Perhaps the one about the two 
sisters instead?)2 But, no. This is the very 
one the Sphinx, as it were, runs with. This is 
the one she apparently stakes her life on— 
 —The one all about feet and uncanny 
footedness asked of a man himself defined 
by an uncanny footedness who is named 
after feet.  
 Hmm… 
 But the Sphinx is not so poor a gambler. 
There is much proverbial method in her 
madness. And if we are to purge from her 
choice of questions such ascriptions to it as 
those of ruinous stupidity or overwrought 
miscalculation (she is, after all, a very avatar 
of the cold scourge of Nemesis) and, 
instead, take her faithfully as a wholly 
capable and acutely adept revolutionary 
menace, one who reads men keenly, then 
let’s examine these methods as tools of the 
erotics of gaming (agon) and the philosophy 
of play. For it may be in 1) probing the 
motivation of the Sphinx to operate as a kind 
of hedge and emblem against false purity in 
any authentic kind of dialectical play, on the 
one hand, as well as 2) examining her own 
critical discernment of something like the 
swelled feet of Oedipus as the cryptic tell of 
his own hidden true name, on the other, that 
commends this more charitable and, I 
believe, more edifying, interpretation both 
of her and of deception in games as such. 
Here I construe the mythic encounter 
between Oedipus and the Sphinx as an effort 
on the part of the latter to teach Oedipus his 
true name. In doing so, and through the 
collateral enlightenment of Oedipus, the 
Sphinx achieves consummation, if not 
apotheosis, for herself as the most fearsome 
of monsters – i.e., a tutelary one. In short, 
and through a heretical reading through 
Ralph Ellison’s refiguring of this mythic 
cycle, I suggest that the Sphinx – in strategic 
self-sacrifice rather than in being outdone – 
does not ultimately lose her bet with 
Oedipus after all.3 
 To these ends, let us prepare to examine 
the relationship between game tells and true 
names. Through several different figures of 
the foot-wager mythos, first consider two 
about-faced pairs of anagrams drawn from 
modern Sphingian narratives. Each signals 
their source in respective gambling lairs – 
Ellison’s “Golden Day,” represented by the 
self-described “rounder,” Peter 
Wheatstraw,4 a gambling hauler of hoarded 
blueprints, and David Mamet’s “House of 
Games,” run by con artist Mike Mancuso. 
We find through these reflexive dyads an 
intuition regarding true names (autonyms) 
and use names (pseudonyms): 
FORD: Listen to this: in her dream: she saw a 
foreign animal. What is the animal? She cannot 
think of the name. It’s saying, the animal is 
saying, ‘I am only trying to do good.’ I say, ‘What 
name comes up when you think of this animal?’ 
She says it is a ‘lurg,’ it is called a ‘lurg.’ So if we 
invert ‘Lurg,’ a lurg’ is a ‘girl,’ and she is the 
animal, and she is saying, ‘I am only trying to do 
good.’ 
MARIA: And now someone has heard her. Good, 
Maggie, good for you. And now what are you 
going to eat?5 
Consider the “girl-lurg” in relation to the 
Sphingian entity sung about by Wheatstraw, 
to whom he professes his love, in Invisible 
Man: 
‘She’s got feet like a monkey  
Legs like frog—Lawd, Lawd! 
But when she starts to loving me 
I holler Whoooo, God-dog! 
Cause I loves my baabay, 
Better than I do myself…’6/7 
Like Mamet’s “girl-lurg,” Ellison’s “God-
dog” is a quite conscious aesthetic 
juxtaposition of the old colloquial 
expression with condensed Sphingian 
overtones, one semantically shot through 
with all manner of tactical implications for 
the recognition and resolution of puzzles. 
This same aural-textual construction of 
reflexive dyads with all their strategic intent 
and intricacy intact is manifest in the 
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brinkmanship of tell-reading within a 
gambling setting. Consider the 
representative tells below for weak and 
strong hands, respectively (Figs. 1a and 
1b8). Noting the middle player and his 
bearing relative to the bettor seated to his 
immediate right, suggests the relevance of 
correct takes on bodily axial dynamism and 
divergence for successful tell-reading. Such 
somatic axes are equally relevant and, 
indeed, wholly akin to their semantic 
counterparts such as those above of Mamet 
and Ellison—behaviors across which are 
indispensible to the activity of true-naming. 
 In terms of tell reading, we may visually 
conceptualize the alternative visions of the 
Sphinx’s foot-wager with Oedipus. Holding 
in parallel the images above with the 
following, the Sphinx is construed in the 
first instance (Fig. 2a) as holding a weak-
hand, indicative of the orthodox 
interpretation of her situation with respect 
her challenger. In the next image (Fig. 2b), 
she holds her head in a position that under 
tell-reading pedagogy is indicative of a 
strong hand, the sort of upper hand Ellison 
would likely ascribe to her. Also, the 
monster appears to fix her gaze upon the feet 
of Oedipus, as if she were reading his tell-
sign and surmising much in the run-up to the 
asking of her riddle.  
 This connection to Sphingian about-
faced anagrams, both of the semantic kind 
within the arts and of the somatic variety in 
gambling (another art form, to be sure) is 
captured within a third modern narrative 
containing the Sphinx. In Jean Cocteau’s 
1934 play, The Infernal Machine, a Theban 
mother reports on the death of her son at the 
hands of the monster: 
MOTHER. My young son says he was caught in 
a police trap, but I know better. The Sphinx 
killed him. If I live to be a hundred I’ll remember 
that morning when they brought him home. I 
opened the door and there I could see the soles of 
his poor feet, and far, far off his poor little face. 
On his neck – just there – was a great wound, but 
the blood wasn’t flowing any more. He was on a 
stretcher. I just said, ‘Oh-oh!’ and fainted dead 
away. 9 
The distal meta-/physical relationship 
described between the feet of the boy and 
his face “far, far off” is cosmologically 
cogent. It bears centrally on the mythic 
conception of the axes and hierarchies of the 
body in the midst of agonistic play with 
other bodies. The response Oedipus gives 
the Sphinx in answer to her riddle, 
Anthropos (the human being), is reflective 
of that cosmic conception, as it is both the 
meta-/physical and etymological reversal of 
his own name. Outlining this relationship in 
Part I of this article via the cosmology of 
Plato as well as through Socratic 
etymological considerations of the term 
Anthropos, I consider how this 
Reply/Replier relationship bears upon the 
nature of deception along the continuum of 
all dialectical play, with a focus on poker 
tells as a modern practical exemplar of the 
Sphingian foot-wager. In Part II, I consider 
the nature of deception as a kind of 
inevitably excessive illumination rather than 
of darkness. And, through this construal, I 
reinterpret the proverbial Oedipus complex 
as a form – manifest in its namesake’s 
political tyranny and as a result of his 
“forgetting his feet” – of covetous obsession 
with light (phoebomania10).  
 
Part I 
 So-called true names are traditionally 
associated with sacred language in the 
performance of some ostensibly supernatural 
activity, e.g., with conjuration, exorcism, 
summoning, etc. Within this sacred – some 
will prefer “magical” – language there has 
existed the belief that the personal name is 
an intrinsic part of the self that is, perhaps, 
in fact, even more intrinsic than physical 
parts of the body. As such, to utter the true 
name of someone or something is to invoke 
the essence in some sense of the inmost 
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other that bears that name.11 
 But what if, for some purpose or other, 
we wanted to know what these true names 
were and didn't? How would we go about 
detecting them? What relation would they 
bear, if any, with the pseudonymous use 
names that hide them? As my preparatory 
discourse on Oedipus suggests, true names 
do bear a relationship with their use names. 
Often, however, true names are not the so 
neatly perfect reversals of use names such as 
those addressed in the preceding section. 
Though it appears that such a notion of the 
cryptic “reflection” of a true name 
somewhere within the use name(s) it bears is 
an incorrigible constant. When they are not 
obviously “perfect” reflections they remain 
“tainted” or, more neutrally, "retentional” 
opposites of each other, and this exposes all 
the more keenly the natural bearing of 
incomplete exclusion that true and use 
names have upon each other. What this 
means is that some aspect of the true name 
is always already to be found in and as a 
vanishingly close opposite – but not 
complete opposite – of its use name. 
Structurally, then, this is a form of irony. 
More specifically, it involves a certain 
figure of speech within the family of irony 
known as enantiosis.12 Without belaboring 
the point, the intuition here is simply that a 
true name is often a near, though not total, 
opposite of the name that hides it. I examine 
this notion through the cosmological 
antecedents of the foot-wager’s 
Reply/Replier relationship – that is, between 
the nature of Oedipus’ name and that of his 
answer to the Sphinx’s riddle. 
 In the Timaeus, Plato articulates a view 
of the human body that renders it divine 
asymmetrically. Within his cosmogony, 
there are no less than three kinds of soul that 
govern the human form, with the godliest of 
them – the intelligence of nous – governing 
the head.13 As this most celestial of bodily 
divisions, the head is that which lifts us from 
the earth as rather a hyper-extended bulb of 
heaven hooked to an earthly outcropping. 
Practically, it contains all of what we are of 
cosmic goodness and, insofar as it manages 
our animal form, prepares us throughout life 
for our return to that good. 
And as for the lordliest form of soul within us, 
one must think of it in this way: that god has 
given it to each of us as a divinity that dwells at 
the peak of our body and lifts us up toward our 
kindred in heaven and away from the earth, since 
we’re not an earthly but a heavenly plant. And 
we say so most correctly, for it is from there, 
whence the soul’s first birth sprouted, that our 
divine part, by suspending our head and root, 
would keep the entire body upright.14 
Only when the head governs as the body’s 
master, then, are they both truly upright. 
 Anthropos is defined as one that looks 
up at. It is distinguished from all those other 
beings in the cosmos that do not look up at 
things. But the implication here is that for it 
to be possible to look up at, one must be 
able to look up from. From whatever 
characterizes that space of oblivion that 
conditions what it is about those that cannot 
look up at, it is away from such a realm that 
the human creature is capable of performing 
a movement of departure. And this 
movement of departure – of looking up 
from, is the necessary transpositional 
reversal of “to look up at.” It is the flipped 
sign of Anthropos. But in forgetting his feet, 
this is precisely what Oedipus cannot do. He 
cannot look up at because he cannot look up 
from. For him, there is no “from” there. As 
such, he cannot perform the defining action 
of Anthropos and, therefore, is not himself 
such a being at all in the critical sense. It is 
the swollenness of his feet that mark him as 
An-anthropos – non-human. His feet are not 
paired in proper agon with his head (nous) 
in order to be capable of the play necessary 
for him to look up at things. Rather, his feet 
are weighted down, grounding him, as it 
were to a condition akin to that which Plato 
reserves for the lowest of earth-crawling 
animals: 
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[T]he beastly form that goes on foot has been 
born from those who neither applied themselves 
at all to philosophy nor at all pondered the nature 
of the heavens, because they no longer made use 
of the circuits in their head but followed as their 
leaders those parts of the soul that are in the area 
of the chest. So from these pursuits their 
forelimbs and their heads were dragged down 
toward earth by their kinship with it and there 
supported;…and this was also the explanation 
for why their kind grew up four-footed and even 
many-footed, since god placed more supports 
under the ones that were more thoughtless, so 
that they might be dragged down toward earth.15 
To which I’d add “swollen-footed.” But, 
indeed, Oedipus so forgets his feet that, 
perhaps, he belongs to what, for Plato, is an 
even more wretched order of earth-dwelling 
creatures: 
And since there was no further need of feet for 
the most thoughtless among these same animals, 
which had their whole body stretched along the 
earth, they begat them footless and crawling 
around on the ground.16 
But the swollen, too-footed, feet of Oedipus 
are the physical source and signal meaning 
of his name. And as such, it puts the word in 
reflective contrast with the word he utters as 
his answer to the riddle of the Sphinx.  
SOCRATES: The name anthropos, which was 
once a sentence, and is now a noun, appears to 
be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is 
the alpha, has been omitted, and the acute on the 
last syllable has been changed to a grave. 
HERMOGENES: What do you mean? 
SOCRATES: I mean to say the word ‘man’ 
implies that other animals never examine, or 
consider, or look up at what they see, but that 
man not only sees (opope) but considers and 
looks up at that which he sees, and hence he 
alone of all animals is rightly anthropos, 
meaning anathron a opopen.17 
 Anthropos and Oedipus are radical (not 
retentional) opposites. Anthropos is that 
which looks up at and Oedipus that which 
draws down to. But it is level-footedness in 
play along with level-headedness that 
conditions the erotics of real play that Plato 
sees as the authentic expression of 
philosophy. It is how anthropos works, since 
to look up at involves looking up from, a 
consideration we will explore more in Part 
II. Oedipus is not level-footed. He is rather, 
over-footed and, as such, cannot engage in 
the activity and practice of looking up at. He 
cannot be anthropos. And, so, he utters the 
word as his answer to the Sphinx from a 
standpoint, if you will, of radical 
estrangement. 
 The Sphinx is aware of the estrangement 
– in the telling tone of Oedipus’ utterance, in 
the tell of his swollen foot, in his inability to 
look up from. And she exploits it, 
terminally. But the terminus of her 
exploitation goes beyond mere death. 
Killing Oedipus, this (non-)man, there on 
the spot, would do little “honor” to the 
abysmal condition of a being such as he who 
cannot play at all. A thorough, perhaps a 
greater, monstrosity than even herself has 
been seen in Oedipus by the Sphinx through 
his telltale feet, the scandal of it a true 
challenge to her own. 
 
Part II 
 Really, tells – when read as such – are 
read as things of excessive brightness.  
 They are depleted or, better, are the 
depletions themselves, of the inherent irony 
that natural, conceptually perceivable, signs 
must bear. When you look at tells in 
gambling, in poker specifically, you find in 
them an absence – a lack to a lesser or 
greater extent, depending on the skill of the 
player – of this most natural form of irony 
that is always only near-irony. So, 
straightforwardly – too straightforwardly for 
nature, it turns out – with tells as tells, 
“weak means strong and strong means 
weak."18 But it is precisely this 
straightforward oppositional irony that 
distinguishes a telling weak or strong hand 
from a natural, that is, real weak or strong 
hand. Any natural hand will detectably 
possess – in its play – the retained opposite 
of its relative power. As a brightness that is 
too bright to be real brightness, let us 
consider for a moment what I mean by this 
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in relation to the Oedipal foot-tell as 
detected by the Sphinx and as indicative of a 
tyrannical obsession with light. How in the 
“foot-forgetting” of his phoebomania does 
King Oedipus and Thebes relate to the 
colonial imperialism of, say, Joseph 
Conrad’s London, or Ralph Ellison’s New 
York City? Consider the following passages 
from the work of the latter two: 
My hole is warm and full of light. Yes, full of 
light. I doubt if there is a brighter spot in all New 
York than this hole of mine, and I do not exclude 
Broadway. Or the Empire State Building on a 
photographer's dream night. But I take advantage 
of you. Those two spots are among the darkest of 
our civilization—pardon me, our whole culture 
(an important distinction, I've heard)—…I know; 
I have been boomeranged across my head so 
much that I now can see the darkness of 
lightness.19 
How this extreme light is utilized by power 
in order, not to illuminate, but to hide things, 
and how such great brightness functions as a 
tell – one of weakness masquerading as 
strength – we will soon examine. Now, 
Conrad:  
The day was ending in a serenity of still and 
exquisite brilliance. The water shown pacifically; 
the sky, without a speck, was a benign 
immensity of unstained light; the very mist on 
the Essex marshes was like a gauzy and radiant 
fabric, hung from the wooded rises inland, and 
draping the low shores in diaphanous folds.20 
 Both Ellison and Conrad see in this 
blinding light a tyranny behind it, a grand 
and compulsive hording addiction that 
gathers ever more such radiance to itself as a 
narcissistic balm of attention-catching and 
stain-removal. But such a compulsion is 
driven, of course, not by the possession but 
the perceived lack of potency, lack of 
enabling light. The mythos of such a lack 
involves a young man who comes to 
question his paternal origins and has a 
meeting that will prove deadly with 
someone – a ruler and charioteer both – 
whose course as sovereign he will disrupt. 
But this is the tale of Phaëton, as well as of 
Oedipus, who, being the son of the Sun 
Phoebus (Helios) itself, seeks his father’s 
place.21 And Ovid describes that place this 
way, from Phaëton’s point of view: 
Here Phaeton still gaining on th' ascent,  
To his suspected father's palace went,  
'Till pressing forward through the bright abode,  
He saw at distance the illustrious God:  
He saw at distance, or the dazling light  
Had flash'd too strongly on his aking sight. 22 
[sic] 
When asked by the Sphinx in Cocteau’s 
Infernal Machine what he wants most, 
among these desires Oedipus says, “the sun, 
the gold and purple” – all abundant 
attributes of the House of Phoebus.23 Unlike 
Ellison’s nameless protagonist and Conrad’s 
Charles Marlow – though not entirely so – 
Oedipus/Phaëton is drawn to the excessive 
light of the potential source of his origin. 
But so taken by it is he that he wholly 
forgets himself or, rather, fails to know 
himself to begin with. Even as a young man, 
he is yet the oblivious infant left to die.  
* * * 
 Jocasta takes her baby boy up the 
mountain, piercing his feet in order to 
suspend him upside down on the bough of a 
tree before abandoning him there. For the 
duration of his torment, the child that will be 
named after the injury he incurs to his feet 
is, in his pain, all there is to him. This 
propels us into a concern for the relationship 
between the torture of language (as tells 
entail the torture of signs) and its 
relationship to the torture of the body (as 
tells implicate the torture of soles). The 
signs of torture (on human bodies), on the 
one hand, and the torture of signs (of certain 
words on the other. Both the literal and the 
literary study of the “signs” (marks) of 
torture are tortured in much the same way. 
When the body is tortured, it is placed under 
a form of duress that forces a part of the 
body to “stand (in)” for the whole. It is, for 
the duration of torment, just “all there is” to 
the body in the midst of torture and at the 
site of elicited pain. In this sense, torture 
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becomes an eliminative process, reducing 
the infinitude of the body human to the 
singular and total “event” of extracted pain. 
But just as we can understand the signs of 
torture in this way, we can similarly 
construe the language of tortured signs. In 
literary creation – in Aeschylus and 
Thoreau, Hawthorne and Ellison, 
Dostoevsky and Orwell – signs are revised 
in the service and disservice of life through 
like means of elimination and replacement.24 
Consider oft-cited slogans from a certain 
dystopian text by the latter: 
Ignorance is Strength / War is Peace / 
 Slavery is Freedom25 
 These are Orwellian instances of what 
I've been calling retentional opposites. It is 
this same inevitable ambiguity with 
language that let’s us recognize in that 
strange backhanded sense that we can what, 
indeed, is “strong” about ignorance in that 
nightmarish verse “Ignorance is Strength” 
and, yes, what we know intuitively is, in 
fact, sort of peaceful about even war in the 
scriptural party motto of INGSOC, "War is 
Peace." That part of war that can be 
ironically “peaceful” is made to crowd out 
the rest of the sign “war.” (Of course, the 
making of war permanent is one such way of 
doing this.) Similarly, the underlying refrain 
of, say, the torture memos of the U.S. Office 
of Special Council a few years ago – memos 
which tortured the very sign “torture” as 
they did – become something, anything 
other than torture. And that whatever 
remained besides torture as both sign and 
effect was just “all there was (to it)” and 
nothing more. The sign was reduced strictly 
to “interrogation,” and could be nothing 
more than the tortured body can be a human 
being but, instead, only a solicited pain-
register. 
 In other words, when Orwell says, for 
example, "War is Peace," he's exploiting 
deeply by destroying thoroughly the 
inherent, nature ambiguity of opposites. He 
makes overbright, hyperluminous, what is, 
indeed, peaceful (e.g., habitual, new normal/ 
normative, annihilative) about protracted 
war. Tells – poker tells and foot-tells alike – 
are tells in this same sense: they 'tell' 
because they are overbright with a reductive 
conceptual element that conditions its own 
lack of ambiguity by eliminating the 
retained opposite. With tells of weakness, 
the reader is picking up on an attempt to 
look like natural weakness. But natural 
weakness always carries with it the taint of 
ambiguity, collusions with strength. The tell 
of weakness is told because weakness is 
overplayed. It is weakness overlit. In this 
sense, a tell of weakness is, as it were, 
"more weak than weak." And a tell of 
strength is "more strong than strength." So, 
again, whenever weak means strong, this 
means, too, that this "weak” is too weak to 
be real weakness. This "strong” is too strong 
to be real strength. It is too unambiguously 
weak. It is too clearly strong. It is too good, 
but better, too pure, to be true. There’s a 
little bit even of the foot in any eye.26  
 The irony of Oedipus’ obstinate 
certitude is that his own excessive clarity is 
what makes him unclear about things. All 
true clarity contains some confusion, some 
illusion. The Sphinx sees in his forgotten 
feet and hears in his answer to her riddle just 
this kind of hyperclarity and exploits it, just 
as Wheatstraw does in hearing the apparent 
clarity of literalness in the voice of the 
protagonist in Invisible Man. Fearsomely, 
both take it upon themselves to help correct 
it. Anthropos, as that which looks up at must 
look up from something and understand this 
obscured though indispensible aspect of 
looking up at in order to truly see. Oedipus 
does not because he never is down in order 
to look up from there in the first place.  
 So, it is not just its opposition but, 
rather, the relative purity of its opposition to 
its converse that makes a tell a tell. In fact, 
without that purity of disambiguation, a tell 
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cannot be a tell that tells at all. Tells tell 
through an excess of clarity however slight. 
A tell is a deception, and a deception 
requires an overbrightening. Deception just 
is an overbrightening. And, too, deception 
is, of course, a darkness. 
 As a term, the “Golden Day” is yet 
another indication drawn from literature of 
excessive light, set within a tyrannical 
colonial setting wherein lurking Sphinxes 
can be found wagering with the gullible. It is 
Ralph Ellison's name for a place where 
decent people from the protagonist's 
Southern college never go and where a band 
of ostensibly crazy war veterans cut up on 
the wrong side of the tracks: "The Golden 
Day. It's a kind of sporting-and-gambling 
house…"27 However, the Golden Day is also 
Ellison's allusion to the title and term which 
the famous historian Lewis Mumford uses to 
identify that storied period in American life, 
literature and letters between 1830 and 
1860, also known as the American 
Renaissance. But if Mumford's is an historic 
revival – one so splendid that it deserves 
styling as the "Golden Day" (with all the 
same sort of blinding luster that we find in 
Conrad's London in Heart of Darkness) then 
it is because in Ellison's view such a golden 
day is hiding something. It is hiding “dark 
with excessive bright,” as John Milton put 
it,28 what we know too well is also going on 
in the United States of that antebellum 
period. It conceals, dark with such excessive 
bright, the cost to large parts of the national 
population for that so-called Golden Day.29 
So, again, here is the irony of Ellison's 
epithet for the other Golden Day, the one in 
his novel. Ellison's Golden Day is separated 
by the railroad tracks and isolated from the 
beautiful college that the protagonist attends, 
where “[t]he buildings were old and covered 
with vines and the roads gracefully winding, 
lined with hedges and wild roses that 
dazzled the eyes in the summer sun.”30 
Ellison's (near-)ironic Golden Day is 
darkened out by the blinding light of the 
beautiful college. But he is suggesting that 
this is an attempt to erase the inevitable, 
radical indebtedness that the college owes to 
the Golden Day “casino” for its existence. 
 When Orwell says in his anti-colonial 
essay, "Killing an Elephant," that, "I 
perceived in this moment that when the 
white man turns tyrant it is his own freedom 
that he destroys," he is making a statement 
about his realization of the ambiguity – the 
collusion – of all natural opposites. Like the 
peace there is somewhere inside war, control 
ends up meaning servitude for the character. 
He does not realize this beforehand, as the 
British Crown is overbright with its 
Burmese colony. His being forced as a 
"sahib" to kill an elephant that he does not 
want to kill makes him aware of this. 
Slowly, the protagonist of Invisible Man will 
learn that the bright college is likewise 
indebted and, indeed, beholden in ways he 
couldn't understand before to the Golden 
Day sporting-and-gambling house – the 
overbrightness of the former no longer a 
concealment but a tell of that condition.  
 And it will be the Golden Day itself, that 
persists Sphinx-like, to teach him this. While 
emphatically a gambling house, Ellison's 
Golden Day has not always been just that 
alone. It has also served variously as a 
church, then a bank, then a restaurant. "I 
think somebody said it used to be a jailhouse 
too," as one of the mad veterans there 
explains. 31  Ellison does this not only to 
reiterate his many Sphingian symbols, but 
also to press the idea of gambling as a cipher 
for ambiguity itself – of the sheer 
taintedness of any sign or figure.  
  Rounder David Sklansky says that card 
games like poker are games of incomplete 
information. These, he maintains, are unlike 
games such as backgammon, checkers, and 
chess, in which there is always a 
mathematically optimal play available for 
each move because all of the information 
Smith | Souls/Soles of Signs  [9]     
needed for perfect play is there on the board 
to be seen. These latter, then, are games that 
trade in a form of denotative certainty that 
poker cannot. They are scientific.32 But, 
Ellison's protagonist asks, "What if history 
was a gambler, instead of a force in a 
laboratory experiment?"33 By this same 
contrast, in poker, one must artistically 
supply what information is missing from the 
game at any given time by both sticking as 
close to how you'd play if such information 
were there and by preventing as far as 
possible your opponents from doing the 
same. He refers to this principle as the 
Fundamental Theorem of Poker.  
 "Creating mistakes is, in a sense," 
Sklansky concludes, "the whole objective of 
the game."34 If this is so, then poker – and 
all games of incompletion as such – are 
antithetical to the manifest intentions of 
totalizing, i.e., radically disambiguating, 
imperialism.35 Imperialism, as someone like 
George Orwell articulates it, is intent on not 
creating mistakes – not even in its "native" 
opponent. Rather, its aim is to create an 
order so certain and so completely 
articulated that everyone, sahib and native 
alike, know their own place exactly within 
the system of the regime. As the regulative 
ideal – that ideal made manifest in Orwell's 
Nineteen Eighty-four – mistakes are made to 
be made impossible because play itself is to 
be made impossible. Everyone is to know 
what to do, how to act, what to expect. In his 
essay "Shooting an Elephant," Orwell relays 
this agenda of colonial imperialism as the 
conditioning of comprehensive, error-free 
social discipline when the narrator speaks of 
his own and the attitude of the crowd that 
watches him: 
But at that moment I glanced round at the crowd 
that had followed me. It was an immense crowd, 
two thousand at the least and growing every 
minute… I looked at the sea of yellow faces 
above the garish clothes – faces all happy and 
excited over this bit of fun, all certain that the 
elephant was going to be shot. …And suddenly I 
realized that I should have to shoot the elephant 
after all. The people expected it of me and I had 
got to do it; I could feel their two thousand wills 
pressing me forward, irresistibly. …[I]n reality I 
was only an absurd puppet pushed to and fro by 
the will of those yellow faces behind. I perceived 
in this moment that when the white man turns 
tyrant it is his own freedom that he destroys. He 
becomes a sort of hollow, posing dummy, the 
conventionalized figure of a sahib. For it is the 
condition of his rule that he shall spend his life in 
trying to impress the "natives," and so in every 
crisis he has got to do what the "natives" expect 
of him. He wears a mask, and his face grows to 
fit it. I had got to shoot the elephant. I had 
committed myself to doing it when I sent for the 
rifle. A sahib has got to act like a sahib; he has 
got to appear resolute, to know his own mind and 
do definite things. To come all that way, rifle in 
hand, with two thousand people marching at my 
heels, and then to trail feebly away, having done 
nothing – no, that was impossible.36  
 Just as words are eliminated in the 
production of the radically denotative 
language of Newspeak in Nineteen Eighty-
four, the colonial tyrant yearns for and, 
indeed, acts out the death of play – play that 
can only occur with the collusion of 
darkness (i.e., in agon with the lack of light) 
in his pursuit of inviolable order. It seeks to 
place everything into daylight with the 
covetousness of such daylight that makes of 
the tyrant a glowing heliocentric 
omniscience. Colonial tyranny behaves as if 
in a world of static aftermath: any game had 
concluded long ago and the present is only 
that post-historical and eternal age of 
“GAME OVER.” The much-regarded End 
of History. By contrast, games – like poker – 
that intended to be incomplete, open-ended, 
and reversible in terms of fortune and 
misfortune are instantiations of play itself 
and thus of the anathema of colonial 
phoebomaniacal obsession. "Sahib" or 
"Master," is the mask and masking use name 
that, at once, tells the narrator’s true name: 
“I perceived in this moment that when the 
white man turns tyrant it is his own freedom 
that he destroys.”37 
 Tells are the equivalent of the use name 
that conceal, but also reveal, a true name. 
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The true name is the actual, that is to say, 
autonymic hand of the player as shown in 
the behavior he's failed, through the tell, to 
hide. As the mere use name, tells announce 
the (telling) player's hidden true name 
through the "excessive bright" a tell gives 
off – those inevitably overly disambiguating 
oppositional behaviors to the player's actual, 
autonymic hand. 
 
Conclusion 
 To read these together – the Sphingian 
wager and the foot figure qua tell totem – as 
a meditation on play and the requirements 
for play, invites wonder about the 
breakdown of play as a living capacity of 
sentient agents and the terminal/interminable 
consequences of such a breakdown. Such 
consequences are grave indeed and are, 
perhaps – as the unseen sign of the Oedipus 
myth suggests – far worse than any loss 
through authentic play could ever be. The 
soul-sign/sole-sign of Oedipus, is a tell that 
the Sphinx reads not only to fathom the risk 
there is in all play but also, finally, to 
recognize the risk to life itself as that to 
which a threat to play itself is. 
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Fig. 2a – The Sphinx as a weak-handed bettor 
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Fig. 2b – The Sphinx as a strong-handed bettor 
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Notes 
                                                         1 The feet of Oedipus were bound by his mother to prevent him from one day committing the actions to which he was fated. The Riddle of the Sphinx – “What goes on 4 legs in the morning, 2 at midday, and 3 in the evening?” asks after the identity of something of uncanny footedness. Oedipus is such a podonymic being himself being asked to name a podonymic being. 2 There is reference, apparently, to at least one alternative riddle of the Sphinx with which she terrorized challengers. See Gods, Goddesses, and Mythology, C. Scott Littleton, ed. 2005. “Some tragedians claimed that the Sphinx also had a second riddle: ‘There are two sisters. One gives birth to the other, then that one gives birth to the first. Who are they?’ The answer to the second riddle is Night and Day, which [in Greek] are both feminine nouns.” P. 1042. 3 We need not domesticate the Sphinx and divest her of her legendarily monstrous nature to suggest that she does not necessarily intend to kill Oedipus. One may simply suggest that she has a more thorough form of killing in mind for him, not merely physical. As such, I would suggest that a reasonable alternative motive, given the riddle she chooses for him, is to destroy the present Oedipus in the worst (possible) way – by teaching him his true name. She gains power to do this when he obliviously utters that name in practical ignorance of just what it means. He is then set on a journey that will radically rescind him (and resurrect him) in a way that merely taking his physical life never could. It is by a tell that she sees in the form of Oedipus’ swollen foot, I’m suggesting, that prompts her terrifying gamble. So, the Sphinx is still every bit a monster – just a greater monster than we at first might have suspected. She’s the more monstrous for being willing to die herself in order to achieve this end. And, perhaps, in terms of wagering, her own death is still a great deal less of a loss than the kind of destruction that awaits Oedipus. 4 See Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man. “Somehow he was like one of the vets from the Golden Day.” P. 174. I assimilate Wheatstraw to the goings-on at the “asylum” because the protagonist rightly does.  5 Exchange between Margaret Ford and Maria Littauer, David Mamet’s “House of Games: A Screenplay.” Though not required in order to make the specific case I’m developing above about how true names are discerned, I interpret Margaret herself as an instantiation of the Sphinx – herself the “foreign animal” – in Mamet’s film. As a psychoanalyst who feels does no real good but, rather, only cons her patients, she essentially exposes and articulates the unique riddle of each of her clients but cannot, for all that, help them to practically resolve the puzzle of themselves. Margaret consumes them as they, nonetheless, give her their confidence. She negotiates her own Elektra complex—the female equivalent of Oedipal neurosis—as evinced by scenes in the film of which, unfortunately, there is insufficient space here to explore at length. But, perhaps most tellingly is the verbal slip she makes in confusing the abusive father of her patient, a “murderess,” for her own. Her father, then, the ultimate source of her own compulsions is, symbolically, Typhon, the hundred-headed patron of all monsters in Greek mythology. Literally, these heads are the rounders led by Mike Mancuso whom she meets in the film. A persuasive case could be made that her interest in the lighter is a manifestation of the fire that Typhon breaths, her Freudian chain-smoking being part of that compulsion. 6 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man, p. 173. Beyond the mere palindromic lyricism that surely inspired the phrase, Ellison would have understood the mythological and cosmological implications of the “God Dog,” from transformations in its astronomical identity as the night sky’s brightest star, Sirius (meaning “glowing” or “scorcher” in ancient Greek), the 
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Vegas                                                                                                                                                                                     Dog-Star in the constellation Canis Major (Greater Dog) – to such figures as the jackal-headed god Anubis and arguably to Jesus Christ as the true “Bright and Morning Star” in the Book of Revelation. All of these references and more are potentially in play in Ellison’s literary Sphingianism. 7 For a deeper discussion of the figure of Wheatstraw and of this scene see Steven C. Tracy, “The Devil's Son-in-Law and Invisible Man”. MELUS, Vol. 15, No. 3, Discovery: Research and Interpretation (Autumn, 1988), pp. 47- 64. ‘Oh goddog, daddy-o,’ he said with a sudden bluster, ‘who got the damn dog? Now I know you from down home, how come you trying to act like you never heard that before!’ By “who got the dog?”, as a Southern black colloquialism, which the protagonist of Ellison’s novel fails to understand, Wheatstraw is asking him whether he’s feeling in control. Symmetrically, are you what controls or are you what’s controlled? He deepens his hint about this meaning for the literal-minded protagonist when he adds, “Well, maybe it’s the other way round….Maybe he got holt to you.” 8 Photos are from Caro’s Book of Tells, 2003. 9 Emphasis mine. Jean Cocteau. The Infernal Machine and Other Plays. Albert Bermel, trans. New Directions Publishing. New York. 1963. P.39. 10 My coinage. From Gk. Phoibos (from which we get the name Phoebe), lit. "bright, shining, radiant.” Tells, then, are always phoebomanic displays. And, as I shall suggest in Part II, colonial tyranny is a relatedly phoebomaniacal spectacle. Phoebus (Helios) and Clymene, in Greek myth, had a son Phaëton or Phaethon. In Ovid’s version, from Metamorphoses, Book II, Phaëton wants convincing by Clymene that the sun god is his real father. As proof, Phaëton is eventually allowed by his father to drive the sun chariot. However, Phaëton is unable to manage, threatening Earth’s ignition. To preempt total ruin, Zeus is forced to kill Phaëton with a thunderbolt. In Plato’s Timaeus, Phaëton is the shining Dawnbearer, the Morning Star, Venus, which chases, only to fall away from, that greater source of starlight, the Sun (Phoebus). (This is likely a Platonic description of the astronomical phenomenon of planetary retrogradation, see Zeyl’s translation, Timaeus, xlvii, and 38e.) This sequence is Biblically equated with Lucifer (the “Bright One”) in pursuit of God’s light. That King Lauis is himself a former charioteer and that it is in a scuffle over right-of-way on the road of their respective chariots that leads to Oedipus killing his father is all relevant to the Oedipal notion of what I’m calling phoebomania, or the acquisitive preoccupation with bright light, as a riposte to the psychoanalytic idea of the Oedipus complex. Oedipus’ departure from Thebes as a child and retrogressive return to his home leading to disaster is, I think, a further parallel with the astronomical mythos of Phaeton and the etymology of Venus/Lucifer. 11 So, his true name is not the one Odysseus at first reveals to his foe, the Cyclops, in Homer's 
Odyssey. (He rather stupidly does later, of course.) It is not the one Rumpelstiltskin casually goes by in the Brother's Grimm. It isn't the one Job knows in order to lament of his woes to God. It isn't that which St. Olaf is familiar with before he finally figures it out in order to use against the troll he must overcome. Superman cannot defeat Mr. Mxyzptlk by calling him by that name. And in a panicked fear of it that they will learn is misplaced, people — half bloods and pure bloods alike — generally shy away altogether from uttering the apparent autonym of "He-Who-Must-Not-Be-Named" — dare I say, Lord Voldemort — in Harry Potter. So these beings go by other names – use names – in their daily lives, lest the revelation of their real names threaten exposure to that which might undo them. 12 Enantiosis, also synoeciosis or discordia concors is a rhetorical means for juxtaposing apparent opposites in order to track their semantic collisions and collusions. For a classic meditation, see Ch. 17, “The Enantiosis Considered,” of Thomas Gibbons’ Rhetoric; Or, A view of its principle tropes and 
figures, 1767. 
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                                                                                                                                                                                  13 Psyche governs the human trunk, with its more deific, superior half above the midriff in the heart, and the inferior below it, in the stomach. Soma administers the lower extremities. 14 Plato, Timaeus. Peter Kalkavage, trans. Focus Philosophical Library. Newburyport, MA. 2001. P. 128. 15 Ibid., p. 130. 16 Ibid. 17 Plato, Cratylus. Benjamin Jowett, trans. Biblibooks. South Carolina. 2007. P. 93 18 Since Mike Caro, this has become a virtual mantra in poker.  And so he himself says in his poker guide, Caro’s Book of Tells. “Once you understand this basic concept and apply it,” he concludes, “poker domination will become easy and your wallet will begin to bulge.” Many other poker masters have invoked it as shorthand for the contrapuntal “Way” of poker and the intrinsic nature of tactical deception within it. 19 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man, p. 6. 20 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, Paul B. Armstrong, ed. W.W. Norton and Co. New York. 2005. P. 2. The potency of Conrad’s illustration is made all the more acute in the apprehension that the light of London he describes is not even that of noon, but merely dusk. The sun would have seemed to truly never set on the British Empire. 21 See Footnote 10 for a further discussion on the clear collusion between the Oedipus and Phaëton myths. Also, see Freud’s Totem and Taboo. His discussion on the name taboo suggests that the totem of a clan is representative of the father’s household authority, and is not to be challenged by speaking its name. To do so is to commit, symbolically, the power-usurping horror of incest. Light itself, I am tempted to say, is treated by myth as a kind of Ur-totem of the father-figure, that which the son more or less subconsciously covets of the father-figure. But such a discussion is for another occasion.  22 Ovid, Metamorphoses. Samuel Garth, John Dryden, et al., trans. 1994-2009. <http://classics.mit.edu/Ovid/metam.2.second.html> 23 Jean Cocteau, The Infernal Machine and Other Plays. P. 44. 24 Consider the language of the torture memos as conceived and composed by Jay Bybee, etc., in this regard. Our semantic inheritance – doubtless through technological social transformations – of generally positive psychological associations to the word “enhancement,” for example, can only make an exploitative substitution for “torture” via the phrase “enhanced interrogation” sound encouragingly enlightened and finally, perhaps, even laudatory. 25 Nineteen Eighty-four.  26 Consider the tarsus in this regard. Etymologically, it is the medical designation for both the heel of the foot as well as the eyelids. From Gk. tarsos "ankle, sole of the foot, rim of the eyelid," originally "flat surface, especially for drying." Online Etymology Dictionary. 27 Invisible Man. P. 80. 28 In Paradise Lost, Book III at line 330, in reference to the bedazzling hem of God: Drawn round about thee  like a radiant Shrine, Dark with excessive bright   Thy skirts appeer, Yet dazle Heav’n that   Brightest Seraphim Approach not, but with both   Wings veil thir eyes…[sic] 29 Ellison is, through the metaphor of gambling, accusing Lewis Mumford of overbrightening history and saying that the term "The Golden Day" that Mumford chooses to refer to that history is a mere use name, not a true name. That is, the very term is a gambling tell for that history's true name 
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Vegas                                                                                                                                                                                     which is not wholly opposite – but, yes, retentionally opposite – of the name "Golden Day." He is, to put it in the black vernacular, and after theorist Henry Louis Gates, Jr.’s construction, “Signifyin’” on Mumford. The simultaneous collision and collusion between these two Golden Days leads to the kind of inevitable chaos (play) that is exactly what Ellison wants to keep us mindful of. Really, The "play's" the thing, as the Bard said — in which we catch the conscience of the king. And, to mix metaphors, all that glitters isn't necessarily the Golden Day. (… Except, of course, when it is.) 30 Invisible Man, 34. 31 Ibid., p. 80. 32 See David Sklansky’s The Theory of Poker. Two Plus Two Publishing. 2004. 33 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man, 441.  34 Sklansky, Theory of Poker, p.36 35 Though I realize I may be forced to limit this claim to certain forms of “classic totalitarianism.” Work by theorists such as Sheldon Wolin on so-called “Inverted Totalitarianism” may suggest that more open forms of such control are open because more amenable to and adept at ambiguous play, perhaps rather like the “house” in gambling. This certainly invites further inquiry.  36 George Orwell. The Orwell Reader: Fiction, Essays and Reportage. Harcourt Brace and Co. 1984. P. 6-7. 37 Ibid. If the use name is "Sahib," than the true name it tells is its retentional opposite: "Native."  In this situation then, just how incorrect would it really be to call the native crowd of two-thousand here "Sahibes"? 
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